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Abstract
In the past several years, many FINRA arbitration cases have been filed against Morgan Kee-
gan, a regional investment firm. The cases are heard in a small number of locations with relatively
small arbitrator rosters. On February 25, 2010, a Tennessee Chancery court vacated a FINRA ar-
bitration award against Morgan Keegan citing the presence of two arbitrators who served on other
Morgan Keegan cases involving the same products in the dispute before it. On March 2, 2010,
another court denied the identical motion to vacate by Morgan Keegan in a separate arbitration
where an award was granted against Morgan Keegan. Responding to the uncertainty concern-
ing the finality of arbitration awards in such cases, FINRA has sought to solve the problem by
recommending that parties avail themselves of FINRA rules for challenging arbitrator appoint-
ments. Unfortunately, each of the likely players in such arbitration disputes—investment firms
and investors—has significant incentive problems from the perspective of challenging arbitrator
appointment. This Note argues that FINRA may be more successful in addressing challenges to
arbitration awards by screening arbitrators to automatically eliminate those who have presided or
are currently presiding over cases involving identical products and parties. Part I of this Note sum-
marizes the mechanics of FINRA arbitrator selections and identifies the methods through which
parties may challenge arbitrator appointment. Part II explores the result of such challenges in the
Morgan Keegan line of cases, reviews the subsequent impact on FINRA proceedings, and outlines
an alternative “auction rate case” model of screening arbitrators. Finally, Part III argues for an
arbitrator selection system featuring the automatic screening method based on the “auction rate
case” model as the solution to the basic risk inherent in high volumes of cases based on singular
financial products.
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ABSTRACT 
In the past several years, many FINRA arbitration cases have been 
filed against Morgan Keegan, a regional investment firm.  The cases 
are heard in a small number of locations with relatively small 
arbitrator rosters.  On February 25, 2010, a Tennessee Chancery 
court vacated a FINRA arbitration award against Morgan Keegan 
citing the presence of two arbitrators who served on other Morgan 
Keegan cases involving the same products in the dispute before it.1  
On March 2, 2010, another court denied the identical motion to 
vacate by Morgan Keegan in a separate arbitration where an award 
was granted against Morgan Keegan.2  Responding to the 
uncertainty concerning the finality of arbitration awards in such 
cases, FINRA has sought to solve the problem by recommending 
that parties avail themselves of FINRA rules for challenging 
arbitrator appointments.3  Unfortunately, each of the likely players in 
such arbitration disputes—investment firms and investors—has 
significant incentive problems from the perspective of challenging 
arbitrator appointment.  This Note argues that FINRA may be more 
successful in addressing challenges to arbitration awards by 
screening arbitrators to automatically eliminate those who have 
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Honors College (Baruch–CUNY), 2010. For their comments and suggestions on earlier 
drafts, the author thanks Professor George Friedman, Seth E. Lipner, and Dale 
Ledbetter. The viewpoints and any errors expressed herein are the author’s alone. 
 1. Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, III, No. W2010-01339-COA-R3CV, 2011 
WL 1047717 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2011) (opinion withdrawn on denial of 
rehearing). 
 2. Morgan Keegan & Co v. Smythe, III, No. W2010-01339-COA-R3-CV, 
2011 WL 5517036 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2011). 
 3. See Guidance to Parties in Cases Involving Morgan Keegan and the RMK 
Bond Funds, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/ 
SpecialProcedures/P121240 (last visited November 1, 2012) [hereinafter FINRA 
Guidance Report]. 
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presided or are currently presiding over cases involving identical 
products and parties. 
Part I of this Note summarizes the mechanics of FINRA arbitrator 
selections and identifies the methods through which parties may 
challenge arbitrator appointment. Part II explores the result of such 
challenges in the Morgan Keegan line of cases, reviews the 
subsequent impact on FINRA proceedings, and outlines an 
alternative “auction rate case” model of screening arbitrators.  
Finally, Part III argues for an arbitrator selection system featuring 
the automatic screening method based on the “auction rate case” 
model as the solution to the basic risk inherent in high volumes of 
cases based on singular financial products. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1980s, the Supreme Court has favored the arbitration 
process, particularly in the securities industry, because arbitration 
provides an efficient method for settling disputes.  Going forward, 
arbitration will likely remain the predominant method through which 
securities claims are resolved.  In response to challenges to arbitration 
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practices under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly described the FAA as establishing “a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state 
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary”4 and “embod[ying] 
[a] national policy favoring arbitration.”5  In 1987, the Court 
emphasized that arbitration is a just and expeditious method of resolving 
securities claims.6  The Supreme Court has recently reiterated that the 
principal purpose of the FAA is to assure contracting parties that the 
terms of their private arbitration agreements will be enforced.7  In light 
of such legal precedent, the practice of arbitration is here to stay and will 
remain a significant force in the realm of securities disputes. 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) draws its 
power most directly from statutes and a long history of self-regulated 
organizations, and should be assessed through the lens of self-regulated 
organization policies.8  Despite the efforts of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) to curb abuses in the market in the wake 
of the market crash of 1929, a regulatory void existed, prompting the 
enactment of the Maloney Act in 1938.9  This law amended the 
Exchange Act to create a system based upon joint regulation, in which 
the task of regulating over-the-counter markets was principally 
performed by representative organizations (e.g. investment bankers, 
dealers, and brokers) under SEC supervision.10  The Securities and 
                                                                                                                                         
 4. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983); see also Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008). 
 5. See AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) 
(quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Moses 
H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24). 
 6. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding 
that arbitration is a valid method of resolving claims under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 
(1989) (holding that arbitration of claims under the Securities Act of 1933 may 
similarly be compelled). 
 7. See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 8. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory 
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 
151-52 (2008). 
 9. See Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate About 
Securities Self-Regulation: It’s Time to End FINRA’s Federal Income Tax Exemption, 
31 VA. TAX REV. 135, 143 (2011); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3 (2010). 
 10. See Rohit A. Nafday, From Sense to Nonsense and Back Again: SRO 
Immunity, Doctrinal Bait-and-Switch, and a Call for Coherence, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
847, 851 (2010). 
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was tasked with exercising appropriate 
supervision in the public interest and exercising supplementary powers 
of direct regulation when necessary.11  Under this governing system, 
regulatory responsibility for the financial sector, historically subject to 
governmental control, was transferred to registered national securities 
associations representative of the securities industry, with each such 
private regulator deemed a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”).12 
A principal goal of SROs is to support the efficient and expedient 
resolution of securities disputes in order to maintain a functional 
investment environment.  Under the supervision of the SEC, SROs 
regulate trading on stock exchanges and are active in securities 
enforcement, policing market activity and broker-dealer misconduct.13  
Out of this policing function, FINRA14 evolved from two larger SROs 
and currently operates the world’s largest arbitration and mediation 
practice for the resolution of disputes between customers and FINRA 
members15 (e.g. broker-dealers) and disputes between FINRA members 
and their employees.16  As the largest independent regulator for 
securities firms doing business in the United States, FINRA is tasked 
with market regulation through contract with major U.S. stock markets, 
including the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Arca, NYSE Amex, 
the NASDAQ Stock Market, and the International Securities 
Exchange.17  Accordingly, analysis of FINRA policies and practices 
                                                                                                                                         
 11. See id. 
 12. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling 
Self-Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1075–76 
(2005). 
 13. Broker-dealers are required by the Exchange Act to become members of 
FINRA in order to be involved with securities transactions. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 
78o(b)(8)-(9). 
 14. FINRA combined the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 
(“NASD”) and the member regulatory functions of NYSE Group, Inc. (“NYSE”). See 
Karmel, supra note 8, at 151–52. 
 15. For a list of FINRA member firms, see FINRA List of Members, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/MemberFirms/ListOfMembers/p012908 (last 
visited November 1, 2012). 
 16. See About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited November 1, 2012). 
 17. See Christopher W. Cole, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA): Is 
the Consolidation of NASD and the Regulatory Arm of NYSE A Bull or A Bear for U.S. 
Capital Markets?, 76 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 251, 257 (2007). 
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must incorporate the broader goal of SROs of supporting an efficient 
securities industry.18 
Arbitration has become a widespread method used by broker-
dealers and customers to resolve disputes and will continue to play a 
large role in disputes arising out of the financial crisis.19  Arbitration, as 
well as mediation, is the prevalent method of dispute resolution between 
customers and brokerage firms because customers need to sign New 
Account Agreements to invest with brokerage firms, which are all 
FINRA members, and such forms generally includes mandatory 
arbitration clauses.20  Even if a customer has not executed an arbitration 
agreement, brokers and brokerage firms are obligated to arbitrate 
disputes upon customer demand.21  As the financial crisis continues to 
ripple through the economy, it is inevitable that investors will seek legal 
recourse against the broker-dealers from whom they purchased financial 
products.22  Due to the mandatory arbitration clauses in customer 
                                                                                                                                         
 18. See Dombalagian, supra note 12, at 1075–76. 
 19. The global financial crisis began with the inflation of the U.S. housing market 
bubble via: (1) government policies of purchasing subprime mortgages and related 
mortgage-backed securities in order to encourage home-ownership and affordable 
housing; and (2) unscrupulous lending practices. See Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial 
Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 55 (2011).  This 
bubble eventually burst in 2007 as a result of financial engineering by which many 
financial firms, acting recklessly, took on excessive risk linked to the housing market 
and other complex financial products. See id.; see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N,  
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.  The financial technology that enabled this 
risk to spread included, principally, securitization, but also derivatives. See Gubler, 
supra. These risks had been split, repackaged, and widely distributed throughout the 
entire economy. Id. 
 20. See Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth 
Through Reform of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an 
Alternative to Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 622 (2010).  Supreme Court 
precedent has made it nearly impossible for investors to challenge a mandatory 
arbitration clause. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 21. See FINRA RULE 12200, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_ 
main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=607; see also Oppenheimer & Co. v. Neidhardt, 56 
F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that securities broker-dealer was required to arbitrate 
dispute under NASD Rule 10301, superseded by FINRA Rule 12200, which requires 
broker-dealers to arbitrate disputes with customers if customer so demands). 
 22. See Bradley J. Bondi, Securities Arbitrations Involving Mortgage-Backed 
Securities and Collateralized Mortgage Obligations: Suitable for Unsuitability 
Claims?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 251, 256 (2009) (explaining the various 
impacts on investment firms as a result of their activity in subprime mortgage 
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agreements in conjunction with the far-reaching impacts of the financial 
crisis, FINRA policies will shape the jurisprudential landscape of 
securities arbitration for years to come.23 
In light of the legislative changes imposed by the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), 
FINRA will likely take on an even greater role.  The Dodd-Frank Act, 
enacted in July of 2010, directed the SEC to look into the practices of 
financial advisers in response to high-profile fraud such as the Bernard 
Madoff Ponzi scheme.24  According to the study conducted by the SEC, 
the agency needed to address its inability to inspect a sufficient number 
of investment advisers on a regular basis.25  In response to this concern, 
Representative Spencer Bachus, Chairman of the Committee on 
Financial Services, proposed the Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 
2011.26  If passed, the Act would create a national investment adviser 
association or an SRO for investment advisers.27  FINRA has already 
voiced its willingness to assume responsibility for this newly created 
SRO, which would regulate investment advisers.28  Therefore, FINRA’s 
regulatory role is likely to grow in the near future. 
                                                                                                                                         
products); see also Suzanne Barlyn, Morgan Keegan Loses $1.95 Mln Auction-Rate 
Case, THOMSON REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/ 
Legal/News/2012/02_-_February/Morgan_Keegan_loses_$1_95_mln_auction-
rate_case/ (describing a recent $1.95 million award by a FINRA panel stemming from 
bad investment in complicated financial products that crashed in 2008 when Wall Street 
imploded). 
 23. See 2012 Regulatory & Examination Priorities Letter, FINRA (Jan. 31, 2012), 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p125
492.pdf (highlighting FINRA’s new regulatory and examination priorities for 2012). 
 24. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 25. See STAFF OF THE DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT OF THE U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER 
EXAMINATIONS (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/ 
914studyfinal.pdf. 
 26. See Investment Advisor Oversight Act of 2011, H.R. 4624, 112th Cong. 
(2012). 
 27. Id. at 2. 
 28. See Jesse Hamilton, FINRA ‘Ready’ to Oversee Investment Advisers, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2011, 2:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-
13/ketchum-says-finra-uniquely-positioned-to-oversee-advisers.html. 
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I. ARBITRATOR SELECTION AND CHALLENGE PROCESS 
Part I of this Note examines the mechanics of FINRA arbitrations 
focusing specifically on how arbitrators are selected.  Next, this part 
explains some of the requirements FINRA imposes on arbitrators to 
decrease the risk of the appearance of bias and increase the rights of 
parties to request new arbitrators.  Finally, it compares the methods by 
which parties may challenge individual arbitrator appointments prior to 
and after the initial hearing and bring a judicial challenge of arbitral 
awards after the conclusion of arbitration. 
A. STARTING AN ARBITRATION 
FINRA’s arbitration rules, called the Code of Arbitration 
Procedure,29 provide a simplified method for selecting arbitrator 
panels.30  The arbitration process begins when an aggrieved party files a 
Statement of Claim.31  This written filing is similar to a complaint in a 
lawsuit: it states the facts of the dispute including pertinent dates, 
names, account numbers, and the request for relief.32  Within forty-five 
days of the receipt of the Statement of Claim, respondents, counter-
respondents, and cross-respondents must serve each other party with an 
answer.33  After a proper filing, the parties are then free to select their 
arbitrators from a random computer-generated list34 of proposed FINRA 
                                                                                                                                         
 29. “The Code of Arbitration Procedure (Customer Code) governs arbitrations 
between investors and brokers and/or brokerage firms.” A different set of rules, “[t]he 
Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes (Industry Code), governs 
arbitrations between or among industry parties.” See Code of Arbitration Procedure, 
FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Rules/CodeofArbitrationPro
cedure/index.htm (last visited November 1, 2012). 
 30. This arbitration process is delineated in the FINRA Rule Manual. See FINRA 
Rules, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid= 
2403&element_id=607 (last visited November 1, 2012). 
 31. See Arbitration Process: File a Claim, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ 
ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Process/FileClaim/index.htm (last visited 
November 1, 2012). 
 32. See FINRA RULE 12302. 
 33. See RULE 12303. 
 34. FINRA uses the Neutral List Selection System (NLSS) on its MATRICS 
computer system to randomly generate lists of arbitrators from FINRA’s arbitrator 
rosters who could serve as panel members. See Arbitration Process: Arbitrator 
Selection, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/ 
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arbitrators.35  FINRA provides a report about each arbitrator’s 
background (“Disclosure Report”) including the arbitrator’s 
employment, education, and training, as well as a list of cases in which 
each of the arbitrators has issued a final decision.36  Parties will then 
review the information, strike any arbitrators from the lists they do not 
want on the panel, and rank the remaining choices.37  After parties have 
submitted their ranked lists, FINRA appoints the final arbitration 
panel.38 
B. STRIKING AND RANKING ARBITRATORS 
FINRA allows both sides to an arbitration to remove, or strike, 
some candidates from the arbitrator roster without cause, and then rank 
the remaining individuals in order of preference.39  The list submitted to 
the parties consists of ten arbitrators from each of FINRA’s non-public 
roster, public roster, and chairperson roster.40  Each party may strike up 
                                                                                                                                         
Process/ArbitratorSelection/ (last visited November 1, 2012); see also Anna Lyons, 
Voluntary Program to Reduce Extended List Arbitrator Appointments, THE NEUTRAL 
CORNER, no. 1, 2012 at 1, 1, available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/ 
arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@arbtors/documents/arbmed/p125884.pdf. 
 35. See FINRA RULE 12400.  For claims of $25,000 or less, FINRA appoints one 
arbitrator and the claim will be subject to the simplified arbitration procedures.  See 
RULE 12401. If the amount of a claim is more than $25,000 but not more than 
$100,000, exclusive of interest and expenses, the panel will consist of one arbitrator 
unless the parties agree in writing to three arbitrators. Id. The remainder of this 
discussion focuses on claims of more than $100,000. 
 36. See RULES 12400–12405. 
 37. Upon acceptance to the roster, arbitrators are assigned to one primary hearing 
location.  FINRA offers seventy-two hearing locations, including at least one in each 
state of the United States, one in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and one in London, United 
Kingdom.  Generally, arbitrators are assigned to the closest in-state hearing location to 
their primary residence.  When arbitrators complete their training and become active on 
the roster, their names will be generated on a random basis and included on arbitrator 
lists sent to parties in that primary hearing location. See FINRA Hearing Locations, 
FINRA,http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitrators/ 
BecomeanArbitrator/HearingLocations/index.htm (last visited November 1, 2012). 
 38. See RULES 12400–12405. 
 39. RULE 12402(d). 
 40. A non-public arbitrator is an individual who has ties to the securities industry 
as defined by Rule 12100(p).  Some examples of relevant ties include having been 
associated with, or registered through, a broker/dealer, or registered (or associated with 
a firm or person registered) under the Commodity Exchange Act within the past five 
years. Other individuals deemed non-public arbitrators include arbitrators who have 
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to four arbitrators for any reason; these reasons are generally based on 
independent research and arbitrator disclosures.41  After the parties 
submit ranked lists, FINRA then creates a separate combined ranked list 
for each arbitrator classification.42 
Customers43 are provided with additional controls over whether the 
final arbitral panel will include public or non-public arbitrators.  On 
January 31, 2011, the SEC approved a rule change to provide customers 
in cases with three arbitrators the option to choose between two panel 
selection methods: (1) All-Public Panel or (2) Majority Public Panel.44  
A customer may elect the optional All-Public Panel for up to thirty five 
days from FINRA’s service of the Statement of Claim.45  Under the All-
Public option, a claimant may elect to strike up to all ten industry 
arbitrators.46  If the customer declines to elect a panel selection method 
in writing by the thirty-five day deadline, the Majority-Public Panel will 
apply, providing for a panel of one chair-qualified public arbitrator, one 
public arbitrator, and one non-public arbitrator.47  The Majority-Public 
                                                                                                                                         
retired after having spent a substantial part of a career engaging in the aforementioned 
activities.  A public arbitrator, on the other hand, is a non-industry affiliated arbitrator.  
See RULE 12100(u). 
 41. RULE 12403(c)(3)(A). 
 42. RULE 12403(c)(4). 
 43. The FINRA Customer Code defines a customer as “not includ[ing] a broker or 
dealer.” RULE 12100(i).  Without a written agreement to arbitrate, only a customer of a 
FINRA member firm may demand arbitration of claims against the firm in a FINRA 
arbitration. See RULE 12200.  Fortunately for investors, courts have broadly interpreted 
the term “customer” despite the vague definition provided by FINRA. This note focuses 
on FINRA arbitration cases in which the “customer” status is not in dispute. For a 
broader explanation of the “customer” issue in light of the Morgan Keegan line of 
cases, see Alexander Ziccardi, Bucking the Trend: A Case for Rejecting an Emerging 
Narrow View of Who Qualifies as a Customer in FINRA Arbitration, 19 PIABA B.J. 57 
(2012). 
 44. See RULE 12403; see also Press Release, FINRA, SEC Approves FINRA 
Proposal to Give Investors Permanent Option of All Public Arbitration Panels (Feb. 1, 
2011), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2011/P122877. 
 45. See Arbitrator Appointment Frequently Asked Questions, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalRe
sources/FAQ/P123922 (last visited November 1, 2012). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
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and All-Public Panel Rules provide customers with significant control 
over the composition of a FINRA panel.48 
In some circumstances, FINRA must extend the arbitrator list in 
order to appoint a final panel, a process that has recently become subject 
to greater party control.49  When an appointed arbitrator withdraws or is 
removed from a selected panel, FINRA will initially attempt to replace 
the arbitrator by consulting the original arbitrator selection list 
completed by the parties.50  If a replacement cannot be appointed using 
this method, FINRA extends the list in order to appoint a full arbitral 
panel.51  Prior to February 1, 2012, extending the list consisted of using 
the MATRICS system to generate arbitrators randomly; such arbitrators 
could only be challenged for cause, which created many complaints 
among parties.52  On February 1, 2012, FINRA began offering a 
voluntary short-list option, allowing parties to agree to strike one 
arbitrator and rank the remaining arbitrators in order of preference from 
a newly-generated list of three potential arbitrators.53  The new short list 
option provides yet another method by which parties maintain control 
over arbitrator selection.54 
C. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
FINRA imposes significant disclosure requirements on its 
arbitrators, which provide the basis upon which parties strike and rank 
potential panels.  Before appointing a final panel, FINRA asks each 
potential candidate to make any further disclosures not included in the 
Disclosure Report based on information specific to the dispute.55  Under 
these additional disclosure requirements, each potential arbitrator must 
reasonably learn of and divulge any conditions which would prevent 
                                                                                                                                         
 48. See Press Release, FINRA, SEC Approves FINRA Proposal to Give Investors 
Permanent Option of All Public Arbitration Panels (stating that the change greatly 
increases investor choice within FINRA Arbitrations Programs). 
 49. See Lyons, supra note 34 at 1–4. 
 50. See id. at 2. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1–2. 
 53. Id. at 3. 
 54. Id. at 4. 
 55. For a list of the types of disclosures required and for examples, see Arbitrator 
Disclosure, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitrators/ 
Responsibilites/Disclosures/ (last visited November 1, 2012). 
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unbiased reasoning and rendering of equitable decisions.56  Such 
conditions include red flags like financial or personal interest in the 
decision and existing or previous relationships with any party, 
representative, or witness.57  In addition, circumstances that are less 
clearly bias-producing may also give rise to arbitrator challenge such as 
associations involving members of the arbitrator’s family or current 
employers, partners, or business associates, as well as present or past 
service as a mediator for any party.58 
D. CHALLENGING ARBITRATORS (PRE-AWARD) 
Under FINRA rules, parties are able to challenge the appointment 
of individual arbitrators for cause after the initial striking and ranking 
period.59  Alternatively, parties may seek to vacate an award entirely 
after arbitration on one of several grounds that resemble for cause 
arbitrator challenges, such as “evident partiality.”60 
1. Pre-hearing Challenges (Rule 12407(a)) 
FINRA rules provide parties with an opportunity to challenge the 
appointment of arbitrators after the initial striking and ranking period.  
Under FINRA Rule 12407(a)(1), a party’s request or motion to remove 
an arbitrator may be honored before the first hearing session if based on 
pre-motion information,  the arbitrator’s  bias, lack of impartiality, or 
any interest in the outcome of the arbitration may be reasonably 
inferred.61  In order to succeed on a removal request, the moving party 
must meet the burden of proof  by reasonably demonstrating that a 
definite interest or bias exists.62  Accordingly, FINRA rules provide 
parties with a mechanism by which to ensure the arbitral panel remains 
neutral.63 
                                                                                                                                         
 56. FINRA RULE 12405(a). 
 57. See Arbitrator Disclosure, supra note 55 (listing arbitrator disclosure 
requirements, which include “any relationship, experience and background information 
that may affect-or even appear to affect-the arbitrator’s ability to be impartial”). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See RULE 12407(a). 
 60. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2006). 
 61. RULE 12407(a). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Arbitrator Disclosure, supra note 55. 
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2. Post-hearing Challenges (Rule 12407(b)) 
In order to further ensure the impartiality of arbitrators, FINRA 
Rule 12407(b) provides a FINRA Director64 with the discretion to 
remove an arbitrator after the first hearing.65  Before appointing an 
arbitral panel, a Director will notify potential arbitrators of the type of 
the dispute and the identity of the parties.66  Each potential arbitrator 
must make reasonable efforts to learn of, and disclose to the Director, 
any circumstances that may preclude the rendering an objective and 
impartial finding.67  Prior to 2001, the Director’s authority to remove 
arbitrators ended after the first hearing or Initial Prehearing 
Conference.68  The Customer Code was amended in 2001 to give the 
Director the power to remove an arbitrator who did not disclose 
information that should have been disclosed under Rule 12405.69  The 
rule states that only the Director or President of Dispute Resolution may 
exercise this authority when such information is discovered after the 
first hearing session or prehearing.70  Principally, the rule allows a party 
to challenge an arbitrator who failed to disclose a material relationship.71  
In conjunction with Rule 12405, Rule 12407(b) increases the fairness 
and efficiency of the arbitration process.72 
E. CHALLENGING ARBITRATORS (POST-AWARD) 
Once an award has been granted, parties may still have a limited 
opportunity for challenging such a verdict on similar grounds as allowed 
                                                                                                                                         
 64. “The term ‘Director’ means the Director of FINRA Dispute Resolution.  Unless 
[FINRA Rules] provide that the Director may not delegate a specific function, the term 
includes FINRA staff to whom the Director has delegated authority.” RULE 12100(k). 
 65. RULE 12407(b). 
 66. See RULE 12405(a). 
 67. For examples of some of the necessary disclosures, see supra Part I.C. 
 68. See NASD Notice to Members 01-13, SEC Approves Amendments to 
Director’s Authority to Remove Arbitrators for Cause 77 (Feb. 2001), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p003
916.pdf (announcing the December 8, 2000 SEC approval of amendments providing 
authority for the Director of Arbitration to remove arbitrators for cause after hearings 
have begun). 
 69. Id. 
 70. RULE 12407(b). 
 71. Id.; see also RULE 12405. 
 72. RULE 12405. 
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under FINRA Rule 12407.  The FAA provides the authority for judicial 
review to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards.73  To vacate an 
award for an arbitrator’s alleged bias, the party seeking vacatur must 
show that the arbitrator demonstrated “evident partiality,”74 a term that 
has been broadly defined by different circuit courts. 
The definition of “evident partiality” has changed several times 
since the Supreme Court defined the term in Commonwealth Coatings 
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.75  Where parties have agreed to 
arbitrate, judicial review is severely limited and the arbitrator’s 
decisions may be set aside only in exceptional situations.76  Most 
relevantly, such circumstances include “evident partiality,” defined 
originally by a plurality in Commonwealth Coatings as action or 
nondisclosure that conveys an appearance or impression of bias.77  
Subsequent district courts have adopted varying degrees of the “evident 
partiality” standard with some courts merely requiring an impression of 
bias while others requiring more than an appearance of bias in order to 
vacate an award.78 
A review of “evident partiality” jurisprudence reveals a spectrum of 
analysis evolving in different circuits marked by two separate standards.  
“Evident partiality” in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits (“impression 
                                                                                                                                         
 73. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2006). 
 74. The FAA states in relevant part that “[i]n any of the following cases the United 
States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order 
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration . . . (2) where 
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.” Id. § 10. 
 75. 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 76. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); see also 9 
U.S.C. § 10(a) (listing limited grounds, such as fraud and corruption, for vacating 
arbitration award). 
 77. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 
–50 (1968). The court reasoned that because of the combination of: (1) arbitrators 
having expansive freedom in their rulings and (2) arbitration awards not being subject 
to appellate review, an arbitrator’s impartiality should meet the standards of Article III 
judges.  The court defined such Article III standards by reference to the American 
Arbitration Association as well as the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which call for a judge 
to be “careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that 
his social or business relations . . . influence[] his judicial conduct.” Id. 
 78. Compare Crow Constr. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc. Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 217, 
220–21 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (adopting the appearance of bias standard while rejecting the 
need for proof of actual bias in order to vacate an arbitration award)  with Morelite 
Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83–84 
(2d Cir. 1984) (finding that in order to vacate an arbitration award under Section 10(b) 
there must be something more than the mere appearance of bias). 
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circuits”) may be met by a mere impression of bias while the Sixth, 
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits (“actual bias circuits”) require something 
more than an appearance of bias in order for a moving party to 
successfully vacate an award.79  The Second Circuit, on the other hand, 
appears to fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum marked by the 
“impression circuits” and the “actual bias circuits.”80  The distinction 
between this emerging circuit split is best characterized by the higher 
burden imposed by “actual bias circuits,” which treat the simple 
appearance of a lack of impartiality as insufficient to upset an arbitral 
award.81  Impression circuits, on the other hand, will set aside an arbitral 
award in cases where, for example, an arbitrator’s law firm formerly 
represented a parent company of one of the claimants, despite the lack 
of actual knowledge by the arbitrator of such a fact, or additional 
evidence to suggest that the arbitrator acted to the benefit (or detriment) 
of any party.82  Courts will likely continue to use various factors for 
“evident partiality” analysis. 
The trend in New York state courts and the Second Circuit appears 
to be a “reasonable person” standard, as recently upheld in U.S. 
Electronics, Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc.83 and Scandinavian 
Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.84  In Morelite 
Construction Corp. v. New York City District Council Carpenters 
Benefit Funds, the Second Circuit first declined to follow the opinion of 
Commonwealth Coatings, holding that it did not have binding effect 
since the Supreme Court’s opinion was a plurality rather than a 
                                                                                                                                         
 79. Compare Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994); Middlesex 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 1982) with Health Servs Mgmt. 
Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992); Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 
879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989); Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140 (10th 
Cir. 1982). 
 80. See Morelite, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984); see also In re Andros Compania 
Maritima, S.A. (Marc Rich & Co., A.G.), 579 F.2d 691, 701–02 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(refusing to vacate an arbitration award based on a professional relationship between a 
challenged arbitrator and the operator of the vessel involved in the arbitration).. 
 81. See e.g., Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp., 975 F.2d at 1264 (requiring a showing of 
more than just an appearance of bias to set aside an award for arbitration partiality). 
 82. See Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
because Arbitrator Conrad had constructive knowledge of the presence of a conflict, his 
“failure to inform the parties to the arbitration resulted in a reasonable impression of 
partiality under Commonwealth Coatings.”). 
 83. 958 N.E.2d 891, 893 (N.Y. 2011). 
 84. 668 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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majority.85  Instead, the court adopted a “reasonable person standard,” 
stating that “evident partiality” is present where a reasonable person 
would find that an arbitrator was biased in favor one party to the 
detriment of another in arbitration.86  U.S. Electronics followed a 
plethora of case law from the Second Circuit,87 reasoning that the 
stringent “evident partiality” standard could not be satisfied by a mere 
appearance of bias even though proof of actual bias is rarely 
established.88  Most recently, in Scandinavian Reinsurance Co., the 
Second Circuit reaffirmed this standard, holding that where non-
disclosure by an arbitrator did not suggest a party suffered bias, then the 
mere suggestion of bias did not warrant vacatur.89  Accordingly, the 
Second Circuit, as well as New York state courts adopt a “reasonable 
person standard” finding that it strikes a proper balance between 
threatening private arbitration and upholding the fairness to which 
parties are entitled.90   
II. MIXED INCENTIVES VERSUS AUCTION RATE MODEL 
Part II of this note examines the mixed incentives for FINRA 
parties to bring essentially identical claims involving analogous 
financial products twice because of the similarity between FINRA Rule 
12407 challenges and “evident partiality” claims and the current arbitral 
panel selection model. 91  Next, this part explores the current panel 
selection model as applied to the Morgan Keegan line of cases and the 
threat to arbitration.  Finally, it compares the current panel selection 
model with a model developed specifically for auction rate cases. 
                                                                                                                                         
 85. See Morelite, 748 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the decision in 
Commonwealth Coatings was not binding because four justices did not constitute a 
majority of the Supreme Court and the opinion of Justice White, writing for himself and 
Justice Marshall, merely concurred in the result). 
 86. Id. at 84. 
 87. See, e.g., Ecoline, Inc. v. Local Union No. 12 of Int’l Ass’n of Heat & Frost 
Insulators, 271 Fed. Appx. 70 (2d Cir. 2008); Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar 
Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007); Lucent Techs. Inc. v. 
Tatung Co., 379 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 88. U.S. Elecs., Inc., 958 N.E.2d at 893. 
 89. See Scandinavian Reins., 668 F.3d at 73. 
 90. See Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d 79 at 84 (“In this way, we believe that the 
courts may refrain from threatening the valuable role of private arbitration in the 
settlement of commercial disputes, and at the same time uphold their responsibility to 
ensure that fair treatment is afforded those who come before them.”). 
 91. See supra Part I.D. 
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A. CURRENT MODEL 
Whether a court applies the original Commonwealth Coating 
“evident partiality” standard or the Second Circuit “reasonable person 
standard,” or any other standards mentioned above, the grounds for 
challenging an arbitral award are highly similar to FINRA Rule 12407 
challenges.92  Under FINRA Rule 12407(a)(1), a party’s request to 
remove an arbitrator may be honored before the first hearing session if it 
is reasonable to infer, based on information known at the time of the 
request, that the arbitrator is biased, lacks impartiality, or has a direct or 
indirect interest in the outcome of the arbitration.93  Under any of the 
standards articulated by courts in applying the “evident partiality” 
standard, a moving party must demonstrate some facts that support an 
appearance of bias in addition to possible other factors such as actual 
bias or arbitrator non-disclosure of information that would lead a 
reasonable person to believe a conflict exists.94  The grounds for vacatur 
are analogous in many respects to arbitrator challenges under Rule 
12407.95 
1. “Evident Partiality” in the Investment Industry (Morgan Keegan) 
In light of the close-knit investment industry, a limited number of 
arbitrators, and an “evident partiality” standard that is in flux, post-
award challenges are likely to be frequent.  The likelihood that parties to 
trade-specific disputes, such as in the securities industry, may have had 
dealings with another arbitrator,96 party, or counsel in the ordinary 
                                                                                                                                         
 92. See id. 
 93. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 94. See, e.g., Woods v. Saturn Distribution Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(distinguishing the burden of proof in nondisclosure cases as requiring a lower 
threshold than the proof of actual bias required when actual bias is asserted); ANR Coal 
Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Consolidation 
Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers, 48 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1995)); 
Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 
84 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding it nearly impossible to prove actual bias); see also Montez v. 
Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 983 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The absence of a consensus 
on the meaning of ‘evident partiality’ is evidenced by the approaches adopted by the 
different circuits.”). 
 95. See supra Part I.D. 
 96. There are only a total of 6,430 public and non-public arbitrators. Dispute 
Resolution Statistics, FINRA (Sept. 2012), http://www.finra.org/ 
2012] FINRA'S ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCESS 183 
course of business, is high.97  In many circuits, a claim of “evident 
partiality” cannot rest solely on a per se FINRA rule violation without 
some additional requisite facts that would lead a reasonable person to 
believe that an actual or potential conflict exists; however, this is not the 
case in all jurisdictions.98  As a result, even though prospective 
arbitrators have a continuing duty to keep the Disclosure Statement 
current, including direct and indirect relationships to any party or their 
counsel, a post-award challenge may still be raised.99  Accordingly, an 
“evident partiality” claim is more likely to be raised in a securities 
dispute, whether meritorious or not, because of the closed-knit nature of 
the investment business, limited number of arbitrators,100 and a vague 
“evident partiality” standard.101 
2. Morgan Keegan 
The FINRA arbitration dispute against Morgan Keegan filed by 
William Hamilton Smythe III (“Mr. Smythe”) is similar to many other 
disputes filed against the firm.  Mr. Smythe concluded that Morgan 
Keegan had invested his money unsuitably in several funds, specifically 
with regards to the RMK family of funds.102  After suffering significant 
losses to his accounts as trustee and individual, Mr. Smythe initiated an 
arbitration proceeding against Morgan Keegan.103  In accordance with 
FINRA rules, the arbitrator selection process resulted in the selection of 
a final panel consisting of Arbitrators Buchanan, Katz, and Hill.104 
On October 2, 2009, after other Morgan Keegan cases on which 
Arbitrators Katz and Hill served were resolved unfavorably to Morgan 
Keegan, the firm filed a recusal motion alleging that Arbitrator Katz was 
no longer impartial because of both his involvement in the previous 
arbitrations and relation to another claimant against Morgan Keegan 
                                                                                                                                         
ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/. 
 97. See Garfield & Co. v. Wiest, 308 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 432 
F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 98. See Montez, 260 F.3d at 980. 
 99. See supra Part I.E. 
 100. See supra note 91. 
 101. See generally Kathryn A. Windsor, Comment, Defining Arbitrator Evident 
Partiality: The Catch-22 of Commercial Litigation Disputes, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 
191, 192 (2009). 
 102. See Morgan Keegan & Co v. Smythe, III, No. W2010-01339-COA-R3-CV, 
2011 WL 5517036, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2011). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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arising out of the same investment Fund.105  On October 12, 2009, 
Morgan Keegan filed an identical recusal motion based on Arbitrator 
Hill’s serving as an arbitrator in the other Morgan Keegan 
proceedings.”106  Arbitrators Katz and Hill declined to recuse themselves 
from the Arbitral Panel.107  The removal motions were then submitted to 
the Director of Arbitration for consideration under FINRA Rule 
12410(a)(1), but the Director denied the motions for removal.108 
Mr. Smythe’s appeal challenging the trial court’s decision to vacate 
the arbitration award and remand to FINRA was denied on the grounds 
of jurisdiction, but it still created uncertainty in future FINRA 
arbitrations.109  As a threshold matter, the Tennessee Court of Appeals 
considered whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mr. 
Smythe’s appeal.110  The Court concluded that although the FAA applied 
to the substantive issues in the case, the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration 
Act (“TUAA”) governed the appealability of the trial court’s order.111  
Under the TUAA, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.112  Despite not ruling explicitly on the merits of the 
issues raised in the appeal as to whether the evidence presented by 
Morgan Keegan demonstrated “evident partiality” of arbitrators Hill and 
Katz, FINRA released a guidance report on arbitrators serving on 
multiple cases involving the same firm.113 
B. MORGAN KEEGAN UNCERTAINTY 
Morgan Keegan rulings threaten the essential purposes of 
arbitration.  The purpose of arbitration is to provide an efficient and 
speedy mechanism for private dispute settlement.114  Where an 
                                                                                                                                         
 105. Id. at *2. 
 106. Id. at *2. Morgan Keegan “filed a petition in the trial court to vacate the 
arbitration award, alleging partiality and bias on the part of two members of the 
arbitration panel[,]” resulting in an order vacating the arbitration award. Id. at *1. 
 107. Id. at *2. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at *18; FINRA Guidance Report, supra note 3. 
 110. Morgan Keegan, 2011 WL 5517036, at *3. 
 111. Id. at *4. 
 112. Id. at *18. 
 113. See FINRA Guidance Report, supra note 3. 
 114. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972); see also 
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (holding that the 
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agreement to arbitrate is present, an arbitrator’s decisions should be set 
aside only under limited circumstances.115  The geographic 
concentration of Morgan Keegan RMK fund cases resulted in numerous 
arbitrators being assigned to multiple proceedings, which involved the 
same company or fund.116  Based on such a concentration and the 
reasoning of the court in Morgan Keegan, parties are more likely to 
bring “evident partiality” claims in the future. Accordingly, the ease of 
challenging an arbitral award undermines the efficiency of the process. 
Furthermore, although Morgan Keegan failed in the Rule 12407 
challenge, it simply awaited a final award and went on to make a 
successful petition for vacatur under an “evident partiality” theory 
largely identical to the FINRA Rule 12407 challenges.117  Morgan 
Keegan’s motion to FINRA alleged that Arbitrators Katz and Hill were 
biased due to both having served as arbitrators on cases with the same 
investments or fund manager in which the panel held against Morgan 
Keegan.  Specifically, the petition cited that Arbitrator Hill had 
previously rendered a judgment for punitive damages in a claim related 
to investments in the same fund and Arbitrator Katz had an indirect 
financial interest in the claims disposition.118  The trial court adopted the 
“reasonable person standard” finding that a reasonable person would 
have concluded that Arbitrators Hill and  Katz would be perceived as 
biased based on evidence of the earlier hearings and conclusions 
involving Morgan Keegan.119  Consequently, Morgan Keegan prevailed 
on obtaining vacatur of the arbitration award and remand to FINRA by 
instituting a post-award action similar to the arbitrator challenges 
brought during the selection of the panel.120 
                                                                                                                                         
sacrifice that arbitration entails in terms of legal precision is recognized and is 
implicitly accepted in the initial assumption that certain disputes are arbitrable). 
 115. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); see also 9 
U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006) (listing limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award, 
including fraud and corruption). 
 116. See FINRA Guidance Report, supra note 3. 
 117. Morgan Keegan, 2011 WL 5517036, at *2. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at *3. 
 120. Id. 
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C. AUCTION RATE CASE MODEL 
FINRA has adopted an alternative form of arbitral panel selection 
in auction rate cases.121  In a news release dated August 7, 2008, FINRA 
announced that it had established a special process for deciding auction 
rate securities (“ARS”) based claims in its arbitration forum.122  Under 
this “auction rate model,” qualifying investors would have the option of 
having their claims heard by a three-person panel of arbitrators, none of 
whom would be affiliated with a firm that recently sold auction rate 
securities.123  This new process came as a result of a procedure 
developed by FINRA for the SEC settlement with Citigroup Global 
Markets, Inc. (“Citi”) in one of many ARS settlements arising out of the 
ARS crisis.124  The proposed solution provided herein follows this basic 
“auction rate model.” 
The “auction rate model” has proven to be an efficient method to 
provide investors and broker-dealers with a high degree of fairness.  As 
of August 7, 2008, more than 170 cases involving ARSs were filed in 
                                                                                                                                         
 121. See Press Release, FINRA, FINRA Creates Process for Arbitrations Involving 
Auction Rate Securities (Aug. 7, 2008), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/ 
NewsReleases/2008/P039025.  An auction rate security (“ARS”) is a debt instrument 
that is typically sold through a Dutch auction.  In a Dutch auction the price of the 
offering is set by incorporating all bids to determine the highest price at which the total 
offering can be sold.  The auction begins with a high asking price, whereby investors 
place a bid for the amount they are willing to buy in terms of quantity and price until an 
accepted price/quantity combination is reached.  Specifically with an ARS, this process 
results in an interest rate that will clear the market at the lowest yield possible.  The 
interest rate is reset periodically at which point investors are generally able to sell their 
securities.  See Special Arbitration Procedures for Investors Involved in Auction Rate 
Securities Regulatory Settlements, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAnd 
Mediation/Arbitration/SpecialProcedures/ARS/index.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 122. See Press Release, FINRA Creates Process for Arbitrations Involving Auction 
Rate Securities, supra note 121. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  ARSs were often sold as a safe alternative to money-market funds, as 
investors could sell their shares at an auction that also determined the rate of interest 
they would receive.  As the credit crisis deepened, however, these ARS auctions began 
to fail.  As a result, investors who treated such securities as liquid, based on the advice 
of investment companies, found themselves short on available funds.  See Gretchen 
Morgenson, 3 Firms Are Asked for Data On Auction-Rate Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2008, at C2 (discussing the ARS crisis and the issuance of a subpoena for information 
relating to the sales of auction rate shares by Merrill Lynch, UBS Securities, and Banc 
of America Investment Services). 
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FINRA’s Dispute Resolution forum.125  Individuals who had either 
worked for a firm that sold ARSs or themselves sold or supervised the 
sale of such securities since January 1, 2005 did not appear on the non-
public arbitrator lists given to parties in ARS cases.126  According to the 
President of FINRA Dispute Resolution at the time, Linda Fienberg, 
“[I]n light of the settlement with Citigroup, FINRA believe[d] it [was] a 
matter of fairness that all investors with auction rate securities claims, 
regardless of the firm involved in the dispute, be handled in this 
manner.”127  Accordingly, the “auction rate model” has been adopted by 
FINRA in the past because it provided an efficient method by which to 
provide investors and broker-dealers with a high degree of fairness.128 
III. FINRA GUIDANCE PROPOSAL 
FINRA acknowledged the ambiguity caused by the Morgan Keegan 
line of cases.129  In response, FINRA opted to advise litigants to follow 
current practices of timely challenges.130 The “auction rate model” 
proposed hereto is based on an effective procedure previously adopted 
by FINRA in limited circumstances.  Part III seeks to outline the 
weaknesses of FINRA’s current framework.  Next, it reintroduces the 
“auction rate” model as a means by which FINRA may reduce the 
ambiguity and inconsistency developing in securities arbitration. 
A. FINRA GUIDANCE 
FINRA issued guidance to parties involving Morgan Keegan and 
the RMK Bond Funds and changed the Disclosure Report.131  The 
FINRA Guidance Report stated that FINRA did not believe that serving 
                                                                                                                                         
 125. See Press Release, FINRA Creates Process for Arbitrations Involving Auction 
Rate Securities, supra note 121. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.; see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Finalizes ARS Settlements with 
Citigroup and UBS, Providing Nearly $30 Billion in Liquidity to Investors (Dec. 11, 
2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-290.htm (discussing finalized 
settlements resolving the SEC’s charges that Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. (Citi) and 
UBS Securities LLC and UBS Financial Services, Inc. (UBS) misled investors 
regarding the liquidity risks associated with ARSs that they underwrote, marketed, and 
sold). 
 128. See supra notes 116–22 and accompanying text. 
 129. See FINRA Guidance Report, supra note 4. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
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on several proceedings concerning the same firm automatically 
disqualified an arbitrator from serving on other cases or require removal 
on the grounds of bias.132  FINRA further acknowledged that under Rule 
12407, it would continue to honor timely challenges to arbitrator 
appointments.133  Additionally, FINRA changed the Disclosure Report 
sent to parties to reflect cases currently assigned to arbitrators.134  If a 
party knew or should have known that an arbitrator was assigned to 
other Morgan Keegan RMK fund matters but did not make a timely 
challenge to the arbitrator, that challenge will not be accepted later in 
the case.135 
B. NEW GUIDANCE PROPOSAL 
The current jurisprudential landscape creates ambiguity and 
inconsistency in securities arbitration.  It is certain that disputes between 
the investing public and the securities industry will continue and 
arbitration will be a part of the resolution process.136  Consistent with the 
overall purpose of SROs and arbitration, FINRA’s securities arbitrations 
process must offer a fair hearing on the merits by knowledgeable and 
impartial arbitrators.137  The existing conditions allow for multiple 
challenges to arbitrators under various standards of “evident partiality” 
and for various grounds such as serving on multiple panels related to the 
same case.138  Though it is not unreasonable that some challenges may 
be meritorious, parties are currently able to bring similar claims in 
multiple venues and on multiple occasions, undermining the efficiency 
                                                                                                                                         
 132. Id. 
 133. A “timely challenge” is one made promptly after the appointment of the 
arbitrator, but before the commencement of the next hearing session. Id.  The FINRA 
Guidance Report specifically mentioned that timely challenges based on an arbitrator 
serving on multiple cases involving the same firm and product have been honored. Id. 
 134. Disclosure Reports now provide details regarding cases an arbitrator has been 
assigned to, including the securities firms and associated persons involved, the date 
assigned, and the role of the arbitrator on the panel.  See FINRA, SAMPLE ARBITRATOR 
DISCLOSURE REPORT (2011), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/ 
@arbmed/@neutrl/documents/arbmed/p122952.pdf. 
 135. See FINRA Guidance Report, supra note 4. 
 136. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitrators Do Not Grow on Trees, 14 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 49, 81 (2008). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See supra Parts I.D–E. 
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and award certainty of arbitration proceedings.139  In order to avoid this 
problem, FINRA’s Neutral List Selection System (“NLSS”) should 
automatically exclude arbitrators having served on identical product 
cases or identical firm cases within a specified period from the list of 
potential arbitrators sent to parties.140  Although this process may 
eliminate large groups of qualified professionals because of their 
experiences, this relatively simple solution will reaffirm fairness and 
efficiency in FINRA securities arbitration. 
The downside to a rule that reduces the number of qualified 
arbitrators that may be empaneled is outweighed by the increase in the 
equity of proceedings.  A system of automatically assessing arbitrator 
impartiality by rigid criteria discourages many qualified and likely 
impartial arbitrators from even applying.141  Furthermore, such a system 
unnecessarily eliminates many capable and honest candidates simply 
because of their prior work experiences.142  Nevertheless, as has been 
noted in many state and federal opinions on arbitral proceedings, it is of 
central importance that fairness not merely be found in rulings but also 
should be clearly visible throughout the arbitral process.143 Although the 
proposed solution may reduce the number of qualifying arbitrators, the 
downside to such an outcome is outweighed by the necessity that 
FINRA proceedings not only provide equitable awards but also provide 
the appearance of fairness. 
CONCLUSION 
Reading Morgan Keegan in conjunction with U.S. Electronics, Inc., 
it appears that the fundamental goals of arbitration, namely cost 
                                                                                                                                         
 139. See supra Part II. 
 140. A similar model was adopted by FINRA in 2008 for ARS based cases.  FINRA 
updated its arbitrator biographical information to identify arbitrators who, since January 
1, 2005, worked for a firm that sold ARSs or sold or supervised someone who sold such 
securities.  Non-public arbitrators who, since January 1, 2005, worked for a firm that 
sold ARSs or themselves sold or supervised someone who did were barred from serving 
on an arbitral panel.  See Panel Composition in Auction Rate Arbitration Cases, 
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/SpecialProcedures/ 
ARS/P124481 (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 141. See Katsoris, supra note 136, at 80. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See generally Pedro Sousa Uva, A Comparative Reflection on Challenge of 
Arbitral Awards Through the Lens of the Arbitrator’s Duty of Impartiality and 
Independence, 20 AM. REV. INT’L. ARB. 479, 485 (2009) (quoting R v. Sussex Justices, 
(1924) 1 K.B. 256). 
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efficiency, expediency, and award certainty will require additional 
FINRA guidance or legislative intervention.144  Courts have struggled to 
clearly define the standard for when an arbitrator’s appearance of an 
undisclosed conflict of interest will warrant the vacating of an 
arbitration award.145  Furthermore, as seen in Morgan Keegan, there has 
been an increase in parties using the appearance of an arbitrator conflict 
to successfully vacate awards after already having raised individual 
challenges during the arbitrator selection process.146  In light of the 
financial crisis, it is inevitable that multiple arbitrations will be brought 
against identical firms and financial products.147  This proposed method 
for creating impartial arbitrator panels would effectively resolve some of 
the inconsistency found in prior judicial determinations and ensure not 
only the rendering of equitable awards but also the appearance of 
fairness. 
                                                                                                                                         
 144. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (finding that 
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